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Abstract	  
At	   their	   origin,	   public	   healthcare	   systems	   were	   designed	   mainly	   for	   the	  
treatment	   of	   acute	   illnesses.	   For	   many	   years,	   therefore,	   public	   health	   care	  
focused	  on	  services	  offered	   in	  healthcare	  establishments	  and	  primary	  care	  was	  
allowed	  to	  evolve	  on	  the	  periphery	  of	  hospitals,	  with	  doctors	  free	  to	  follow	  their	  
own	  conception	  of	  how	  best	  to	  provide	  and	  follow	  up	  on	  care.	  As	  hospital	  costs	  
grew,	   however,	   and	   new	   challenges	   regarding	   the	   provision	   of	   care	   began	   to	  
emerge,	   governments	   felt	   increasingly	   responsible	   for	   organizing	   the	   front	   line	  
(Nolte	  and	  McKee	  2008).	  How	  doctors	  would	  be	  called	  upon	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  
new	  configuration	  of	  services—particularly	  in	  Canada,	  where	  physicians	  function	  
as	   independent	  entrepreneurs—is	   the	   subject	  of	   this	  article,	  which	   investigates	  
the	   decision	   to	   introduce	   family	   medicine	   groups	   (FMGs)	   to	   the	   province	   of	  
Quebec.	  
Introduction	  	  	  
In	  recent	  years,	  the	  organization	  of	  front-­‐line	  services	  and	  primary	  care	  has	  become	  a	  focal	  point	  
for	  several	  healthcare	  systems	  in	  the	  Western	  world	  (Saltman	  et	  al.	  2006;	  Starfield	  1998).	  One	  of	  
the	  main	   reasons	   has	   been	   the	   population’s	   need	   for	   an	   integrated	  medical	   care	   system	   that	  
addresses	   disease	   prevention,	   health	   promotion	   and	   social	   support	   in	   addition	   to	   standard	  
curative	   care	   (Hofmarcher	   et	   al.	   2007).	   This	   need	   has	   been	   accentuated	  by	   aging	   populations	  
and	   by	   the	   increasing	   prominence	   of	   chronic	   diseases	   in	   the	   range	   of	   pathologies	   for	   which	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patients	  seek	  treatment	   (Lafortune	  and	  Balestat	  2007)—and	  by	  the	  resulting	  rise	   in	  cost	   (Sassi	  
and	  Hurst	  2008).	  	  
At	   their	   origin,	   public	   healthcare	   systems	   were	   designed	   mainly	   for	   the	   treatment	   of	   acute	  
illnesses.	  For	  many	  years,	  therefore,	  public	  health	  care	  focused	  on	  services	  offered	  in	  healthcare	  
establishments	   and	   primary	   care	   was	   allowed	   to	   evolve	   on	   the	   periphery	   of	   hospitals,	   with	  
doctors	   free	   to	   follow	  their	  own	  conception	  of	  how	  best	   to	  provide	  and	   follow	  up	  on	  care.	  As	  
hospital	   costs	   grew,	   however,	   and	   new	   challenges	   regarding	   the	   provision	   of	   care	   began	   to	  
emerge,	   governments	   felt	   increasingly	   responsible	   for	   organizing	   the	   front	   line	   (Nolte	   and	  
McKee	   2008).	   How	   doctors	   would	   be	   called	   upon	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   new	   configuration	   of	  
services—particularly	   in	   Canada,	  where	   physicians	   function	   as	   independent	   entrepreneurs—is	  
the	  subject	  of	   this	  article,	  which	   investigates	  the	  decision	  to	   introduce	  family	  medicine	  groups	  
(FMGs)	  to	  the	  province	  of	  Quebec.	  
Background	  	  
Canada’s	  Medicare	  healthcare	  system	   is	   the	   legacy	  of	  a	  compromise	  that	   took	  place	  nearly	  50	  
years	   ago	   in	   the	   province	   of	   Saskatchewan.	   In	   the	   summer	   of	   1962,	   the	   Government	   of	  
Saskatchewan’s	  attempts	  to	  establish	  a	  public	  healthcare	  insurance	  system	  for	  selected	  services	  
had	   led	   to	   an	   intense	   struggle	   between	   the	   government,	   the	   North	   American	   medical	  
establishment,	   and	   the	   province's	   physicians.	   Fearing	   that	   a	   publicly	   financed	   system	   would	  
mean	   a	   significant	   loss	   of	   income	   and	   government	   interference	   in	  medical	   decisions,	   doctors	  
brought	   services	   to	   a	   halt	  with	   the	   1962	   Saskatchewan	  Doctors'	   Strike—this,	   despite	   Premier	  
Tommy	   Douglas’	   promise	   that	   the	   province	   would	   pay	   doctors’	   going	   rate	   (Campbell	   and	  
Marchildon	   2007).	   After	   negotiation,	   Saskatchewan’s	   doctors	   accepted	   public	   payment	   on	  
condition	  that	  the	  State	  renounce	  all	  right	  to	  control	  their	  activities:	  what	  McMaster	  University	  
health	  research	  expert	  John	  Lavis	  calls	  the	  “core	  bargain”	  (Lavis	  2004).	  
Saskatchewan’s	  compromise	  would	  be	  scaled	  up	  in	  1964,	  when	  the	  Royal	  Commission	  on	  Health	  
Services	   recommended	   nationwide	   adoption	   of	   Saskatchewan's	   model	   of	   public	   health	  
insurance	   (Royal	   Commission	   on	   Health	   Services	   1964).	   In	   1966,	   the	   Liberal	   minority	  
government	  of	  Lester	  B.	  Pearson	  created	  the	  program	  in	  question,	  with	  the	  federal	  government	  
paying	  50%	  of	  costs	  and	  provinces	  paying	  the	  other	  half.	  The	  system	  was	  standardized	  in	  1984	  
with	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   Canada	   Health	   Act	   (Government	   of	   Canada	   1985),	   which	   gives	  
Canadians	   the	   right	   to	   universal,	   free	   access	   to	   “medically	   necessary”	   services:	   that	   is,	   any	  
healthcare	   service	   provided	   by	   a	   qualified	   physician.	   In	   Canada,	   such	   physicians	   include	  
thousands	  of	  family	  doctors	  who	  function	  as	  independent	  practitioners,	  billing	  State	  authorities	  
directly	  under	  a	  fee-­‐for-­‐service	  system	  and	  answering	  only	  to	  the	  provincial	  and	  federal	  medical	  
orders	  that	  are	  responsible	  for	  monitoring	  the	  profession	  and	  protecting	  the	  public	  (Beaulieu	  et	  
al.	  2008).	  	  
In	   recent	   years,	   however,	   this	   segregation	   of	   roles	   has	   begun	   to	   be	   called	   into	   question.	  	  
Significant	  increases	  in	  healthcare	  costs,	  the	  realization	  that	  the	  quality	  of	  care	  has	  been	  lacking	  
and	   the	   recognition	   that	   public	   protection	   is	   not	   necessarily	   assured	  by	  medical	   professionals	  
who	  act	  as	  both	   judge	  and	   jury,	  has	  caused	  governments	   to	  claim	   their	   right	   to	   intervene	  not	  
only	   as	   regards	   healthcare	   costs	   but	   also	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   organization	   and	   delivery	   of	  
medical	   care	   (Romanow	   2002).	   While	   most	   State	   interventions	   have	   addressed	   supply—for	  
example,	   caps	   to	   the	   number	   of	   students	   admitted	   to	   faculties	   of	   medicine—(Hudon	   et	   al.	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2009)—in	   the	   past	   decade,	   provincial	   commissions	   such	   as	   the	   Saskatchewan	   Commission	   on	  
Medicare	  (2001)	  and	  the	  Alberta	  Framework	  for	  Reform	  (2002)	  as	  well	  as	  federal	  studies	  such	  as	  
the	  Kirby	  Report	  (2002)	  and	  the	  Romanow	  Report	  (2002)	  have	  all	  underlined	  the	  desirability	  of	  
governments’	  intervening	  specifically	  to	  centre	  health	  care	  around	  front-­‐line	  services	  in	  order	  to	  
improve	  population	  health	  and	  welfare.	  
In	  Quebec,	   front-­‐line	  reform	  dates	   to	  the	  1970s.	   In	  1967,	   the	  Castonguay-­‐Nepveu	  Commission	  
had	   led	   to	   the	   establishment	   of	   provincial	   Medicare,	   under	   which	   front-­‐line	   care	   had	   been	  
structured	  with	  mixed	  results	  (Commission	  d'enquête	  sur	  la	  santé	  et	  le	  bien-­‐être	  social	  1967).	  As	  
a	   result,	  Quebec’s	   decision-­‐makers,	  managers	   and	  healthcare	   professionals	   undertook	   various	  
initiatives	   to	   restructure	   the	   front	   line.	   These	   initiatives	   left	   the	   province	   with	   three	   main	  
organizational	  models:	   CLSCs	   (Centres	   locaux	   de	   services	   communautaires	   –	   Local	   Community	  
Service	  Centres),	  family	  practice	  units	  (general	  practitioner	  training	  clinics	  principally	  located	  in	  
hospitals),	  and	  private	  practices.	  	  	  
Despite	  the	  great	  expectations	  inspired	  by	  their	  innovative	  structure,	  CLSCs	  never	  succeeded	  in	  
fulfilling	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  aspects	  of	  their	  mandate:	  to	  act	  as	  Quebecers’	  first	  point	  of	  
contact	  with	  Quebec’s	  healthcare	  system.	  This	  is	  largely	  due	  to	  the	  fierce	  competition	  to	  which	  
CLSCs	  were	  subjected	  by	  private	  medical	  practices,	  which	  in	  Quebec	  have	  always	  attracted	  the	  
most	   physicians	   (Bozzini	   1988;	   Turgeon	   et	   al.	   2003).	   The	   Fédération	   des	   médecins	  
omnipraticiens	  du	  Québec	   (FMOQ)	  reports	   that	   in	  2006-­‐2007,	  of	   the	  60%	  of	  Quebec’s	  general	  
physicians	  who	  practiced	  principally	   on	   the	   front	   line,	   62%	  worked	  mainly	   in	  private	  practice1	  
(Fédération	  des	  médecins	  omnipraticiens	  du	  Québec	  2008).	  Research	  by	  a	  private	  firm	  hired	  by	  
the	   FMOQ	   shows	   that	   “general	   practitioners	   in	   private	   practice	   value	   their	   autonomy,	   the	  
entrepreneurial	   nature	   of	   their	   activities,	   and	   the	   simplicity	   of	   the	   management	   required.	   …	  
They	  want	  their	  practice	  to	  be	  considered	  a	  business	  and	  not	  a	  public	  entity”	  (SECOR	  2000:	  121	  -­‐	  
translation	   ours).	   Policy-­‐makers	   had	   originally	   hoped	   to	   attract	   family	   physicians	   to	   CLSCs	   by	  
showcasing	  the	  CLSCs’	  multidisciplinary	  environment	  and	  by	  paying	  CLSC	  doctors	  a	  salary	  rather	  
than	   fee-­‐for-­‐service	   amounts.	   But	   true	   multidisciplinarity	   within	   the	   CLSCs	   has	   had	   difficulty	  
taking	  root	  (Turgeon	  et	  al.	  2003)	  and	  the	  disparity	  in	  services	  offered	  from	  one	  CLSC	  to	  another,	  
due	  to	  CLSCs’	  democratic	  approach	  to	  the	  development	  of	   their	   services,	  has	  created	   inequity	  
between	   regions	   and	   territory	   and	   impeded	   patients’	   access	   to	   care	   (Bozzini	   1988).	   Viewed	  
broadly,	  these	  elements	  explain	  the	  dominance	  of	  the	  private	  practice	  model,	  which	  was	  already	  
evident	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  which	  was	  reinforced	  by	  the	  Rochon	  reforms	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  1990s.	  
By	   promoting	   the	   shift	   to	   outpatient	   care	  without	   investing	   savings	   in	   the	   front	   line,	   Rochon	  
expanded	  the	  market	  for	  primary	  care	  services	  and	  private	  practices	  grew	  proportionately.	  
Faced	   with	   this	   fragmentation	   of	   its	   front-­‐line	   care	   model	   and	   the	   ill	   effects	   on	   patient	  
satisfaction	  and	  the	  access	  to	  care,	  in	  2000,	  the	  Parti	  Québécois	  government	  named	  the	  latest	  in	  
a	   series	  of	   commissions	   to	   study	   the	   future	  of	   the	  provincial	  healthcare	   system.	  Among	  other	  
recommendations,	   the	  Clair	  Commission2	   (Commission	  d'étude	  sur	   les	   services	  de	   santé	  et	   les	  
services	  sociaux	  2000)	  proposed	  a	  new	  organizational	  model	  for	  the	  provision	  of	  primary	  care:	  
the	  family	  medicine	  group	  (FMG).	  With	  this	  model,	  the	  Commission	  aimed	  to	  profoundly	  modify	  
the	   paradigm	   and	   philosophy	   of	   how	   services	   were	   organized,	   mostly	   by	   adjusting	   doctors’	  
remuneration	   system,	  making	   changes	   to	   case	  management	   practices	   and	   introducing	   a	   truly	  
multidisciplinary	  approach	  to	  the	  practice	  of	  medicine.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  FMOQ	  published	  a	  
study	   that	   declared	   the	   advantages	   of	   reorganizing	   the	   front	   line	   so	   as	   to	   promote	   more	  
continuous	  and	  integrated	  care	  (SECOR	  2000).	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Until	  now,	  research	  on	  Quebec’s	  front-­‐line	  services	  has	  most	  often	  been	  approached	  from	  three	  
angles:	   the	   organization	   of	   medical	   practices	   (Geneau	   et	   al.	   2008),	   patients’	   experiences	  
(Haggerty	  et	  al.	  2007),	  and	  the	  performance	  of	  Quebec’s	  primary	  healthcare	  system	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  its	  
objectives	   (Commissaire	   à	   la	   santé	  et	   au	  bien-­‐être	  2009;	  Haggerty	  et	   al.	   2008;	  Haggerty	  et	   al.	  
2004;	  Pineault	  et	  al.	  2005).	  The	  FMG	  model,	  meanwhile,	  has	  been	  mainly	  studied	  from	  a	   legal	  
perspective	  (Rioux	  2008)	  or	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  effect	  on	  interprofessional	  collaboration	  (Beaulieu	  et	  
al.	   2006).	   Regarding	   the	   political	   process	   that	   caused	   the	   FMG	   model	   to	   emerge	   and	   be	  
retained,	  however,	  little	  has	  been	  published.	  	  	  
As	   a	   first	   step	   towards	   filling	   this	   gap,	   this	   article	   studies	   the	   evolution	   of	   the	   relationship	  
between	  doctors	  and	  the	  State:	  more	  specifically,	  how	  the	  decision	  to	  implement	  FMGs	  can	  be	  
seen	  as	  both	  an	  innovation	  and	  a	  compromise	  that	  allowed	  the	  government	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  
organization	  of	   front-­‐line	   care	  while	   respecting	  doctors’	  professional	   autonomy.	  Exploring	   this	  
question	  will	   allow	   us	   to	   analyze	   how	   the	   relationship	   between	   physicians	   and	   the	   State	   has	  
changed	   over	   time	   and	   evaluate	   whether	  Medicare’s	   “core	   bargain”	   has	   been	  modified	   as	   a	  
result.	  	  
Data	  for	  the	  study	  come	  from	  13	  semi-­‐directed	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  individual	  interviews	  with	  key	  actors	  
who	   helped	   design	   and	   implement	   FMGs	   in	   Quebec.	   All	   interviewees	   had	   an	   excellent	  
understanding	  of	  the	  policy,	  having	  either	  helped	  design,	  adopt	  or	  implement	  it	  or	  having	  been	  
part	   of	   an	   organization	   that	   participated	   in	   the	   process.	   Our	   sources	   consisted	   of	   former	  
ministers	   of	   health	   and	   social	   services,	   members	   of	   the	   Commission	   of	   Study	   of	   Health	   and	  
Social	   Services	   (the	   Clair	   Commission),	   FMOQ	   administrators,	   public	   policy	   experts,	   general	  
practitioners	  working	   in	   FMGs	   and	   civil	   servants	   from	  Quebec’s	  Ministry	   of	   Health	   and	   Social	  
Services	   (Ministère	   de	   la	   santé	   et	   des	   services	   sociaux	   –	   MSSS)	   or	   related	   organizations.	   In	  
addition	  we	   analyzed	   the	   grey	   and	   the	   scientific	   literature	   published	   by	   government	   agencies	  
and	  various	  organizations.	  	  
What	  is	  an	  FMG?	  	  
The	  Ministry	  of	  Health	  and	  Social	  Services	  defines	  an	  FMG	  as	  follows:	  “A	  group	  of	  doctors	  who,	  
for	   the	   benefit	   of	   registered	   persons,	   work	   closely	   with	   nurses	   in	   a	   setting	   conducive	   to	   the	  
practice	   of	   family	   medicine”	   (Ministère	   de	   la	   Santé	   et	   des	   Services	   sociaux	   2009).	   FMGs	  
comprise	  “the	   full-­‐time	  equivalent	  of	  6	   to	  12	  doctors	  …	  [who	  also]	  work	   in	  close	  collaboration	  
with	  other	  health	   and	   social	   services	  professionals,	   especially	   social	  workers	   and	  pharmacists.	  
Operating	   in	   an	   FMG	   facilitates	   communication	   between	   professionals	   and	   helps	   services	   be	  
more	   integrated”	   (Ministère	  de	   la	   Santé	  et	  des	   Services	   sociaux	  2002	   -­‐	   translation	  ours).	   	   The	  
objectives	  of	  the	  FMG	  model	  are	  to	  (1)	  provide	  all	  residents	  of	  Quebec	  with	  access	  to	  a	  family	  
doctor;	   (2)	   increase	   the	   accessibility	   of	   services	   and	   enhance	   the	   quality	   of	   care;	   (3)	   improve	  
management,	   the	   continuity	   of	   care	   and	   the	   monitoring	   of	   registered	   patients;	   (4)	   augment	  
complementarity	  with	  other	  healthcare	  system	  entities;	  and	  (5)	  promote	  and	  enhance	  the	  role	  
of	  the	  family	  doctor	  (Ministère	  de	  la	  Santé	  et	  des	  Services	  sociaux	  2002,	  2003).	  
The	  backbone	  of	  FMGs	  is	  registration,	  a	  mutual	  agreement	  between	  the	  family	  doctor	  and	  the	  
patient	   (Ministère	   de	   la	   Santé	   et	   des	   Services	   sociaux	   2003)	   that	   is	   designed	   to	   act	   as	   the	  
cornerstone	   of	   ongoing	   improvements	   in	   continuity	   and	   accessibility.	   General	   practitioners	  
working	  in	  an	  FMG	  may	  register	  between	  1000	  and	  2200	  patients	  each	  (Ministère	  de	  la	  Santé	  et	  
des	   Services	   sociaux	   2002)	   and	  must	   coordinate	   their	   services	  with	   those	   of	   other	   healthcare	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system	   entities,	   directing	   patients	   towards	   outside	   resources	   when	   appropriate.	   FMGs	   must	  
provide	  their	  patients	  with	  appointments	  within	  a	  reasonable	  delay	  and	  ensure	  periods	  of	  time	  
at	   night,	   on	   weekends	   and	   during	   holidays	   when	   doctors	   can	   be	   seen	   on	   a	   walk-­‐in	   basis,	  
whether	  at	  the	  FMG	  or	  at	  an	  entity	  with	  which	  the	  FMG	  has	  an	  agreement	  to	  provide	  care.	  For	  
clients	  in	  a	  precarious	  medical	  condition,	  those	  suffering	  from	  a	  complex	  disease	  and	  those	  with	  
a	   chronic	   disorder,	   on-­‐call	   medical	   services	  must	   be	   available	   during	   extended	   hours.	   Nurses	  
play	   a	   pivotal	   role	   in	   the	   FMG	   system,	   participating	   in	   interviews	   and	   screening;	   in	   the	  
systematic	   monitoring	   of	   patients	   with	   special	   needs;	   in	   patient	   education	   and	   care;	   and	   in	  
disease	  prevention	  and	  health	  promotion	  activities.	  The	  nurse	  also	   liaises	  with	  other	  actors	   in	  
the	   healthcare	   sector.	   In	   addition	   to	   nurses,	   FMGs	   may	   employ	   nutritionists,	   psychosocial	  
experts,	  physiotherapists,	  pharmacists	  and	  other	  health	  professionals.	  	  
Because	  FMGs	  build	  upon	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  structure	  of	  front-­‐line	  services,	  only	  entities	  already	  
offering	  general	  medicine	  services—CLSCs	  (now	  Centres	  for	  Health	  and	  Social	  Services	  –	  Centres	  
de	  santé	  et	  de	  services	  sociaux,	  or	  CSSSs3),	  private	  practices	  and	  family	  practice	  units	  (UMFs)—
may	  become	  FMGs.	  Doctors	  choosing	   to	  work	   together	   in	  an	  FMG	  must	  sign	  an	  agreement	  of	  
association,	  enter	  into	  a	  service	  agreement	  with	  their	  local	  CSSS	  and	  sign	  an	  agreement	  with	  the	  
Regional	   Board	   (now	   the	   Local	   Health	   and	   Social	   Services	   Networks	   Development	   Agency	   –	  
l’Agence	  de	  développement	  de	  réseaux	  locaux	  de	  services	  de	  santé	  et	  de	  services	  sociaux).	  They	  
must	  also	  agree	  to	  the	  remuneration	  scheme	  negotiated	  by	  the	  FMOQ	  (Ministère	  de	  la	  Santé	  et	  
des	  Services	  sociaux	  2003).	  	  
Development	  and	  Adoption	  of	  the	  FMG	  model	  
To	  understand	  where	  the	  FMG	  model	  came	  from,	  we	  must	  consider	  the	  principal	  events	  that	  led	  
to	   the	   problem	  with	   front-­‐line	   services	   and	   helped	   forge	   a	   social	   consensus	   on	   the	   need	   for	  
reform.	  	  
As	   previously	   stated,	   the	   evolution	   of	   the	   CLSC	   network	   was	   hampered	   by	   several	   stumbling	  
blocks.	  To	  begin	  with,	  soon	  after	  their	  creation,	  CLSCs	  were	  quickly	  checkmated	  by	  the	  allure	  of	  
private	   practices,	   which	   “were	   rapidly	   extended	   over	   the	   whole	   Quebec	   territory	   by	   a	  
modernizing	  medical	  elite	  who	  confronted	  the	  social-­‐democratic	  legislators	  and	  technocrats	  on	  
their	  own	  terrain	  by	  offering	  citizens	  a	  widely	  accessible	  system	  of	  primary	  care”	  (Bozzini	  1988:	  
357).	   Furthermore,	   the	   disparities	   in	   the	   services	   offered	   from	   one	   CLSC	   to	   the	   next	   led	   to	  
problems	  of	  access.	   In	  the	  mid	  1980s,	  a	  publication	  on	  the	  future	  of	  CLSCs	  recommended	  that	  
CLSCs	   reduce	   the	   number	   of	   programs	   they	   offered	   and	   concentrate	   their	   mission	   on	   a	   few	  
areas	   (Ministère	   de	   la	   Santé	   et	   des	   Services	   sociaux	   1987).	   But	   it	   soon	   became	   evident	   that	  
Quebec’s	   healthcare	   system	   consisted	   of	   two	   networks	   that	   operated	   in	   parallel,	   and	   rather	  
than	  continue	  to	  expand	  the	  CLSC	  network	  as	  originally	  intended,	  the	  MSSS	  chose,	  in	  the	  1980s,	  
to	  do	  no	  more	  than	  maintain	  it	  (Bourque	  1988).	  	  
“The	   problem	  with	   CLSCs	   is	   that	   they	  were	   never	   able	   to	   have	   a	   real	   striking	  
force	  given	   that	   the	   service	  offer	  was	   so	  different	   from	  one	  CLSC	   to	  another.”	  
(Interviewee	  #6,	  translation	  ours)	  
Meanwhile,	   the	   practice	   of	   medicine	   was	   changing.	   By	   the	   end	   of	   the	   1990s,	   older	   general	  
practitioners	  mostly	  worked	  alone	  in	  private	  practice.	  Young	  doctors,	  in	  contrast,	  were	  taking	  a	  
more	  diversified	  and	   less	  organized	  approach,	  working	   in	  both	  emergency	   rooms	  and	  medical	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clinics	  or	   in	  specialized	   fields.	  The	   increasing	  number	  of	  women	   in	   the	  medical	  profession	  was	  
bringing	  up	  new	  concerns	  with	  respect	  to	  workloads	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  work	  was	  organized	  
(Conseil	   Médical	   du	   Québec	   2001).	   The	   lack	   of	   coordination	   and	   integration	   of	   care	   were	  
aggravating	  public	  dissatisfaction	  and	  were	  compounding	  problems	  of	  an	  aging	  population,	  staff	  
shortages	  and	  the	  increased	  complexity	  of	  medical	  conditions.	  	  	  
At	   the	   same	   time,	  Quebec	  was	  experiencing	   the	   repercussions	  of	  a	  major	   restructuring	  of	   the	  
healthcare	  system.	  One	  such	  repercussion	  was	  recurrent	  emergency	  room	  overcrowding.	  When	  
Pauline	  Marois	   took	  office	  as	  Minister	   for	  Health	  and	  Social	  Services	   in	  early	  1999,	  one	  of	  her	  
priorities	  was	  to	  reduce	  emergency	  room	  overcrowding.	   	  Among	  the	  administration’s	  methods	  
(Ministère	  de	  la	  Santé	  et	  des	  Services	  sociaux	  1999)	  was	  the	  reform	  of	  the	  front	  line.	  	  
More	   cognizant	   that	   any	   other	   player	   of	   the	   extent	   of	   the	   problem,	   Quebec’s	   medical	  
community	  had	  already	  begun	  to	  prepare	  for	  reform.	  As	  early	  as	  1996,	  the	  FMOQ	  had	  debated	  
how	  to	  reorganize	  the	  practice	  of	  medicine	  in	  Quebec	  and	  proposed	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  DRMG4	  for	  
each	   Regional	   Board.	   Next,	   in	   2000,	   the	   College	   of	   Family	   Physicians	   of	   Canada	   suggested	   a	  
model	   for	   front-­‐line	   services	   based	   on	   family	   practice	   networks	   made	   up	   of	   interdisciplinary	  
teams	   (The	  College	  of	  Family	  Physicians	  of	  Canada	  2000).	  Also	   in	  2000,	   the	  FMOQ	  endorsed	  a	  
private	  study	  that	  recommended	  developing	  an	  entrepreneurial	  medical	  environment,	  ensuring	  
the	   promotion	   and	   profitability	   of	   private	   practices	   and	   encouraging	   general	   practitioners	   to	  
develop	  business	  plans	  (SECOR	  2000).	  Based	  on	  these	  recommendations,	  the	  FMOQ	  advocated	  
a	   service	   organization	  model	   that	   reorganized	   the	   practice	   of	  medicine	   into	   private	   practices	  
within	  integrated	  networks	  in	  order	  to	  improve	  accessibility,	  continuity	  and	  case	  management.	  
These	  recommendations	  would	  pave	  the	  way	  for	  the	  main	  characteristics	  of	  the	  FMG	  model.	  
“And	  the	  consensus	  among	  those	   involved	  …	  was	  pretty	  solid.	  …	  [for]	  this	   idea	  
that	  groups	  of	  doctors	  were	   responsible	   for	  a	  given	  population,	  working	  as	  an	  
interdisciplinary	   team,	   no	   longer	   on	   their	   own”	   (Interviewee	   #8,	   translation	  
ours)	  	  	  
As	  early	   as	  1999-­‐2000,	   the	  government	  had	  a	   fairly	   clear	   idea	  of	  what	  would	  be	  necessary	   to	  
reform	   front-­‐line	   services,	   and	   in	   June	   2000,	   Health	  Minister	  Marois	   and	   the	   Parti	   Québécois	  
administration	   requested	  Michel	  Clair,	   former	  National	  Assembly	  minister	   and	  ex-­‐president	  of	  
the	  Treasury	  Board,	   to	  head	  the	  new	  Commission	  of	  Study	  for	  Health	  and	  Social	  Services.	  This	  
commission	   was	   charged	   with	   crystallizing	   solutions	   and	   generating	   political	   support	   for	   the	  
reform	   of	   the	   healthcare	   system	   in	   general	   and	   front-­‐line	   services	   in	   particular.	   The	   Clair	  
Commission	  would	  prove	  to	  be	  a	  seminal	  institution	  for	  many	  aspects	  of	  health	  care	  in	  Quebec;	  
our	   research	   suggests	   that	   the	   roots	   of	   Quebec’s	   FMGs	   lie	   nowhere	   more	   than	   in	   the	  
Commission’s	  deliberations.	  	  
The	   commissioners	   explored	   organizational	  models	   for	   front-­‐line	   services	   both	   in	   Canada	   and	  
abroad,	  reconnoitering	  establishments,	  reviewing	  the	  literature	  and	  creating	  panels	  of	  experts.	  
They	  took	  particular	  interest	  in	  two	  cases:	  Great	  Britain’s	  General	  Practitioner	  (GP)	  Fundholders,	  
and	  the	  American	  Health	  Maintenance	  Organization	  (HMO)	  model.	  These	  two	  models	  had	  two	  
elements	   in	  common:	  a	  solid	  organization	  based	  on	  shared	  material	  and	  human	  resources	  and	  
an	  emphasis	  on	  population-­‐based	  responsibility	  and	  integration.	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Throughout	   its	   inquiry,	  the	  Clair	  Commission	   looked	  for	  ways	  to	  dovetail	  the	  FMOQ’s	  proposal	  
with	  commissioners’	  concerns.	  Doctors	  presented	  their	  preferred	  practice	  model	  at	  Commission	  
hearings,	   and	   the	   Commission	   reviewed	   the	   work	   of	   the	  MSSS.	   Thus	   working	   from	   different	  
angles,	  the	  Commission	  identified	  various	  elements	  that	  coalesced	  in	  the	  FMG	  concept.	  	  In	  other	  
words,	  the	  Clair	  Commission	  did	  not	  invent	  a	  new	  model.	  Rather,	  it	  regrouped	  and	  gave	  form	  to	  
existing	  ideas.	  	  
“Clair	   came	   to	   us	   with	   the	   model	   of	   family	   medicine	   groups.	   It	   was	   hardly	  
original,	   but	   it	   had	   the	   merit	   of	   being	   adapted	   for	   Quebec,	   in	   Quebec.”	  
(Interviewee	  #5,	  translation	  ours)	  
The	  concept	  was	  presented	  to	  the	  public	  as	  tool	  to	  reform	  front-­‐line	  services.	  Accordingly,	  the	  
Commission	  held	  a	  series	  of	  public	  forums:	  
“We	  wanted	   there	   to	  be	  an	  exchange	  of	   ideas,	  we	  wanted	  people	   to	   take	  our	  
ideas	   further,	   so	   that	  when	  we	   laid	   [our	   ideas]	   out	   in	   our	   report,	   they	  would	  
have	  already	  been	  circulated,	  they	  would	  have	  already	  garnered	  some	  support.”	  
(Interviewee	  #7,	  translation	  ours)	  
The	  commission	  also	  tested	  its	  principal	  recommendations	  on	  important	  actors	  in	  the	  healthcare	  
system.	  The	  idea	  was	  to	  propose	  at	  least	  one	  front-­‐line	  service	  model	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  discussion:	  
adjustments	  could	  always	  be	  made	  later.	  	  
The	  Commission’s	  proposed	  model	  
Writing	   about	   how	   FMGs	   should	   work,	   the	   commissioners	   reasoned	   that	   “[Given	   that]	   the	  
organization	   of	   a	   primary	   care	   network	   constitute[s]	   the	   main	   foundation	   of	   the	   health	   and	  
social	   services	   system,	   …,	   this	   network	   [should]	   be	   created	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   current	   dual	  
reality	   of	   CLSCs	   and	   physicians’	   offices”	   (Commission	   d'étude	   sur	   les	   services	   de	   santé	   et	   les	  
services	  sociaux	  2000:	  42).	  In	  the	  words	  of	  one	  commissioner,	  
“We	   just	   tried	   to	   have	   a	   concept	   that	   was	   extremely	   operational	   rather	   than	  
theoretical	   or	   categorical.	   I’d	   say	   that	   our	   concern	  was	  with	   operations.	   After	  
that,	  whether	   it	   is	   a	   co-­‐op,	   a	   CLSC	   or	   a	   private	   practice,	   that	  was	   a	   non-­‐issue	  
insofar	  as	  I	  was	  concerned.	  The	  main	  thing	  was	  that	  the	  population	  benefit	  from	  
care	  by	  a	  team	  of	  front-­‐line	  professionals.”	  (Interviewee	  #7,	  translation	  ours)	  
To	   reach	   this	  goal,	  FMGs	  had	   to	  allow	  general	  practitioners	   to	  work	  collectively,	   supported	  by	  
clinical	  nurses.	  Practitioners	  also	  had	  to	  be	  responsible	  for	  a	  well-­‐defined,	  registered	  population.	  
The	  establishment	  of	  FMGs	  was	  to	  be	  entrusted	  to	  various	  types	  of	  clinicians,	  regrouped	  under	  
the	   authority	   of	   a	   reputable	   doctor	   recognized	   by	   his	   peers.	   As	   for	   remuneration,	   the	  
Commission	   proposed	   a	  mixed	   system	   consisting	   of	   three	   elements:	   capitation	   for	   registered	  
patients,	   a	   base	   amount,	   and	   fee-­‐for-­‐service	   payments.	   The	   Commission	   also	   recommended	  
that	   the	   implementation	   of	   FMGs	   be	   gradual	   and	   voluntary	   and	   use	   flexible	  mechanisms.	   As	  
stated	  in	  the	  final	  report:	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“We	  propose	  a	  vision	  and	  goals	  but	  do	  not	  expect	  to	  have	  defined	  everything	  in	  
detail	   before	   this	   vision	   can	   be	   implemented.	   Rather	   than	   imposing	   a	   single,	  
detailed	  model	  everywhere,	  let’s	  move	  forward	  with	  those	  who	  share	  this	  vision	  
and	  want	  to	  achieve	  it.	  Let’s	  support	  them,	  facilitate	  their	  work,	  define	  the	  ways	  
and	   means	   with	   them	   as	   we	   proceed,	   evaluate	   the	   activities	   and	   adjust	  
accordingly.	   In	  other	  words,	   let’s	   act,	  move	   forward,	   evaluate	  and	  adjust.	   This	  
strategy,	  recommended	  to	  the	  Commission	  by	  several	   international	  experts,	   is,	  
in	  their	  view,	  the	  key	  to	  the	  successful	  transformation	  of	  the	  health	  network	  in	  
many	  countries.”	   (Commission	  d'étude	  sur	   les	   services	  de	  santé	  et	   les	   services	  
sociaux	  2000	  :	  54)	  
Rather	  than	  introducing	  pilot	  projects,	  then,	  the	  Commission	  suggested	  issuing	  an	  invitation	  to	  
tender	  before	  negotiating	  details	  with	  the	  FMOQ.	  
The	  Clair	  report	  was	  officially	  submitted	  to	  Health	  and	  Social	  Services	  Minister	  Pauline	  Marois	  on	  
December	  18,	  2000,	  and	  the	  government	  appropriated	  it	  very	  quickly.	  According	  to	  government	  
documents,	   several	   factors	   argued	   in	   favour	  of	   the	   FMG	  model.	  More	  and	  more	  patients	  had	  
trouble	  finding	  a	  family	  doctor,	  and	  fragmented	  services	  left	  the	  patient	  responsible	  for	  linking	  
the	  medical	   professionals	  working	   on	   his/her	   case.	   The	   lack	   of	   available	  medical	   care	   outside	  
regular	  working	  hours	  increased	  the	  use	  of	  emergency	  services,	  and	  because	  services	  were	  not	  
organized	  coherently,	  doctors	   lost	  time	  performing	  tasks	  for	  which	  their	   level	  of	  expertise	  was	  
not	  necessary.	  In	  addition,	  multiple	  consultations	  with	  more	  than	  one	  doctor	  complicated	  long-­‐
term	  follow-­‐up,	  duplicated	  services	  and	  sub-­‐optimized	  patients’	  access	  to	  specialists.	  Finally,	  the	  
increasing	   specialization	   of	   medical	   practices	   was	   eroding	   the	   role	   of	   the	   family	   doctor	  
(Ministère	  de	  la	  Santé	  et	  des	  Services	  sociaux	  2002,	  2003).	  	  
For	  these	  reasons,	  in	  February	  2001,	  less	  than	  two	  months	  after	  the	  report	  had	  been	  submitted,	  
Marois	   announced	   the	   government’s	   intention	   to	   proceed	  with	   the	   implementation	   of	   FMGs.	  
After	  Marois	  was	   replaced	  by	  Rémi	   Trudel	   as	  Minister	   of	  Health	   and	   Social	   Services	   in	  March	  
2001,	   Trudel	   informed	   the	   Council	   of	   Ministers	   that	   FMGs	   would	   be	   the	   first	   of	   Clair’s	  
recommendations	  that	  he	  would	  put	  into	  place.	  	  
The	  project	  was	  rapidly	  entrusted	  to	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Health	  and	  Social	  Services,	  which	  promptly	  
set	  up	  two	  implementation	  teams	  and	  a	  management	  committee.	  The	  Ministry	  Working	  Group	  
(Groupe	  de	  travail	  ministériel),	  composed	  of	   representatives	  of	  professional	  orders	  and	  unions	  
as	  well	   as	  university	  experts,	  was	   responsible	   for	  providing	   recommendations	   to	   the	  minister:	  
this	   entity	   played	   a	   political	   role.	   The	   Implementation	   Support	   Team	   (Groupe	   de	   soutien	   à	  
l’implantation—GSI)	  was	  made	  up	  of	   clinicians	  and	  other	  professionals	   (nurses,	   social	  workers	  
and	  pharmacists).	   Its	   role	  was	  “to	  help	  develop	  the	  overall	  FMG	  concept,	   including	  the	  role	  of	  
the	  professionals	   involved,	   the	  agreements	  and	   the	  operating	   tools”	   (Ministère	  de	   la	   Santé	  et	  
des	   Services	   sociaux	   2003).	   The	   mandate	   of	   this	   group	   was	   thus	   operational.	   Finally,	   a	  
management	  committee	  made	  up	  of	  deputy	  ministers,	  chief	  executive	  officers	  and	  coordinators	  
was	   responsible	   for	   managing	   the	   proceedings	   and	   seeing	   to	   the	   overall	   consistency	   of	   the	  
project	  (Ministère	  de	  la	  Santé	  et	  des	  Services	  sociaux	  2003).	  The	  interplay	  between	  the	  first	  two	  
entities,	   one	   of	   which	   was	   political	   and	   the	   other	   operational,	   was	   not	   always	   optimal	   and	  
conflicts	  arose.	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The	  professionals	  and	  clinicians	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  dossier	  took	  on	  the	  task	  of	  determining	  how	  the	  
model	  would	  function.	  During	  the	  development	  phase,	  the	  Clair	  Commission	  had	  been	  primarily	  
interested	   in	   English	   and	   American	   experiences.	   During	   the	   execution	   phase,	  MSSS	  managers	  
mainly	  studied	  models	  from	  Sweden	  and	  Ontario,	  sending	  observational	  missions	  to	  study	  how	  
organization	   took	   place.	   Ontario’s	   Family	   Health	   Networks	   and	   Family	   Health	   Groups	  models	  
were	  practically	  identical	  to	  the	  FMGs	  proposed	  by	  the	  Clair	  Commission.	  Like	  Quebec’s	  model,	  
Ontario’s	  models	  were	  founded	  on	  a	  mixed	  remuneration	  system,	  around-­‐the-­‐clock	  access	  and	  
patient	  registration.	  These	  models	  would	  have	  the	  greatest	  influence	  on	  the	  MSSS’s	  realization	  
of	  the	  FMG	  concept	  in	  Quebec.	  	  
When	  ideals	  confront	  reality	  
Since	  the	  government	  needed	  doctors	  to	  be	  on	  board	  with	  the	  reform,	  the	  key	  features	  of	  the	  
FMG	  model	  had	  to	  be	  negotiated.	  The	  three	  thorniest	   issues	  that	  opposed	  the	  government	  to	  
the	   FMOQ	   (which	   represented	   general	   practitioners)	   were	   also	   three	   of	   the	   model’s	   most	  
fundamental	  aspects:	  registration,	  extended-­‐hours	  access	  and	  doctors’	  remuneration.	  	  
The	   government	   was	   determined	   to	   make	   registration	   of	   the	   clientele	   with	   a	   given	   general	  
practitioner	  an	  intrinsic	  element	  of	  the	  practice	  of	  general	  medicine	  in	  Quebec.	  But	  the	  FMOQ	  
felt	  that	  while	  registration	  was	  well	  adapted	  to	  rural	  regions	  where	  the	  clientele	  was	  captive	  to	  a	  
shortage	   of	   doctors,	   in	   urban	   areas	   where	   doctors	   were	   more	   numerous,	   it	   risked	   causing	  
doctors	  to	  compete	  for	  patients.	   In	  addition,	  the	  FMOQ	  perceived	  registration	  as	  an	  affront	  to	  
doctors’	  autonomy	  and	  patients’	   freedom	  of	  choice	  and	  as	  an	  unwelcome	   increase	   in	  doctors’	  
responsibilities	   (Ministère	   de	   la	   Santé	   et	   des	   Services	   sociaux	   2002,	   2003).	   	   By	   the	   end	   of	  
negotiations,	   however,	   the	   FMOQ	   had	   accepted	   the	   principle	   and	   registration	   became	   a	  
distinctive	  feature	  of	  Quebec’s	  new	  FMGs.	  	  
As	   for	   accessibility,	   the	   FMOQ	   refused	   outright	   to	   allow	  extended-­‐hours	   access	   for	   registered	  
patients	  to	  become	  an	  essential	  element	  of	  the	  FMG	  model.	  Accordingly,	  extended-­‐hours	  access	  
was	  watered	   down	   from	   access	   for	   all	   registered	   patients	   to	   access	   only	   for	   those	   registered	  
patients	   who	   were	   victims	   of	   a	   chronic	   disorder	   and	   had	   a	   severe	   loss	   of	   autonomy.	  
Furthermore,	   FMGs	   were	   free	   to	   enter	   into	   agreements	   with	   other	   front-­‐line	   providers	   in	   a	  
given	  territory	  to	  provide	  extended	  access	  on	  nights	  and	  weekends.	  	  
Doctors’	   remuneration	   was	   the	   most	   difficult	   feature	   to	   negotiate.	   Quebec’s	   medical	  
associations	   suspected	   that	   the	   proposed	   capitation	   formula	   for	   registered	   patients	   was	   a	  
precursor	  to	  eliminating	  fee-­‐for-­‐service	  payments	  altogether.	  It	  is	  true	  that	  the	  FMG	  model	  was	  
designed	   to	   phase	   out	   at	   least	   part	   of	   the	   fee-­‐for-­‐service	   system.	   	   In	   this	   regard,	   the	   Clair	  
Commission	  recommended	  that	  :	  
“the	  family	  physician	  who	  works	  in	  a	  Family	  Medicine	  Group,	  an	  office	  or	  a	  CLSC,	  
would	  be	  paid	  according	  to	  a	  mixed	  system:	  an	  amount	  based	  on	  the	  number	  of	  
people	   registered	   and	   their	   health	   and	   social	   characteristics;	   a	   lump	   sum	   for	  
participation	   in	   certain	   programs	   (CHSLD,	   emergency,	   CLSC	   programs,	  
vulnerable	  population	  groups,	  etc.),	  according	  to	  contracts	  or	  agreements;	  and	  a	  
fee-­‐for-­‐service	   amount	   either	   for	   specific	   prevention	   activities	   or	   to	   support	  
productivity	   in	  high-­‐volume	  activities.”	  (Commission	  d'étude	  sur	  les	  services	  de	  
santé	  et	  les	  services	  sociaux	  2000	  :	  52)	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The	   Commission	   considered	   changes	   to	   the	   provincial	   remuneration	   system	   to	   be	   the	  
cornerstone	  of	  the	  reform	  of	  professional	  practices	  and	  the	  organization	  of	  front-­‐line	  care.	  But	  
when	  negotiations	  opened,	  the	  FMOQ	  opposed	  capitation	  staunchly,	  defending	  fee-­‐for-­‐service	  
and	  pointing	  out	  the	  difficulty	  of	  implementing	  capitation	  in	  a	  system	  where	  patients	  were	  free	  
to	  consult	  the	  doctor	  of	  their	  choice.	  	  
The	  negotiations	  of	   the	   interim	  agreement	  on	  remuneration	  began	  around	   June	  2001	  and	  the	  
FMOQ	  and	  the	  MSSS	  arrived	  at	  an	  agreement	  in	  2002.	  The	  MSSS	  had	  very	  little	  leeway	  because	  
its	   hands	   were	   tied	   by	   financial	   constraints	   imposed	   by	   the	   Treasury	   Board.	   As	   negotiations	  
advanced,	   its	   goal	   shifted	   from	   across-­‐the-­‐board	   capitation	   to	   a	   progressive	   decrease	   in	   the	  
proportion	  of	   fee-­‐for-­‐service	  payments.	   The	  FMOQ,	   in	   contrast,	  wished	   to	  protect	  established	  
remuneration	  methods,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  beginning:	  	  
“We	   always	   said	   that	   our	   condition	   for	   any	   agreement	   was	   that	   during	   the	  
experimenting	  period,	  during	  the	  transition	  period,	  people	  would	  be	  allowed	  to	  
keep	   their	  existing	   remuneration	  method,	  with	  a	   few	  minor	   changes	  here	  and	  
there.”	  (Interviewee	  #1,	  translation	  ours)	  
Hence,	  the	  final	  solution	  was	  a	  compromise:	  a	  large	  proportion	  of	  remuneration	  continued	  to	  be	  
fee-­‐for-­‐service,	  but	  amounts	  were	  added	  to	  enhance	  working	  conditions	  in	  FMGs.	  For	  instance,	  
doctors	  working	   in	   FMGs	   received	   $7	   per	   patient	   registered5.	   An	   additional	   sum	  was	   paid	   for	  
vulnerable	  patients	  (patients	  5	  and	  under	  or	  75	  and	  over),	  and	  extended-­‐hours	  availability	  was	  
compensated	  at	  a	  surplus	  of	  $52	  per	  day	  of	  work.	  To	  recognize	  the	  time	  spent	  on	  administrative	  
matters,	   the	  doctor	   in	  charge	  of	  the	  FMG	  received	  approximately	  $300	  per	  week,	  and	  3	  hours	  
per	   week	   for	   each	   full-­‐time	   equivalent	   position	   was	   budgeted	   to	   compensate	   doctor-­‐nurse	  
communication	   and	   interprofessional	   collaboration.	   The	   MSSS	   also	   financed	   the	   purchase	   of	  
computer	  equipment	  and	  paid	  the	  salaries	  of	  nurses	  and	  administrative	  assistants.	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  remuneration	  of	  general	  practitioners	  in	  Quebec	  has	  never	  been	  
regulated	   by	   a	   definitive	   agreement	   but	   rather	   by	   over	   2500	   separate	   agreements.	   Because	  
salary	   negotiations	   are	   centralized	   under	   the	   FMOQ,	   any	   sum	   paid	   by	   the	   government	   to	   a	  
general	   practitioner	  working	   in	   an	   FMG	  must	   be	   paid	   to	   all	   other	   general	   practitioners	   in	   the	  
province	   as	   well.	   Doctors	   working	   in	   private	   practice	   thus	   receive	   the	   same	   allocation	   for	  
patients	  with	  special	  needs	  as	  do	  doctors	  working	  in	  FMGs.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  interim	  agreement	  
substantially	   weakened	   the	   attractiveness	   of	   the	   new	   FMG	   model	   insofar	   as	   doctors	   were	  
concerned.	  It	  also	  failed	  to	  make	  provision	  for	  penalties	  in	  the	  event	  that	  the	  patient	  and/or	  the	  
doctor	  violated	   the	   registration	  agreement.	  The	  question	  of	   the	  delegation	  of	   tasks	   to	  nurses,	  
lauded	   in	   the	   FMG	  model,	  was	   also	   problematic	   because	   general	   practitioners	  were	   afraid	   of	  
losing	  revenue	  by	  delegating	  responsibilities	  to	  nurses.	  In	  summary,	  the	  changes	  to	  the	  terms	  of	  
remuneration	   and	   working	   conditions	   negotiated	   as	   part	   of	   the	   FMG	   model	   resulted	   in	   real	  
salary	  increases	  in	  the	  order	  of	  15%	  to	  20%	  for	  FMG	  doctors	  but	  made	  no	  fundamental	  changes	  
to	   doctors’	   remuneration	   system	   and	   failed	   to	   magnetize	   doctors	   to	   the	   FMG	  model	   as	   had	  
originally	  been	  intended.	   
Discussion	  and	  Conclusion	  
Our	  analysis	  of	  the	  interviews	  and	  the	  documentation	  traces	  the	  decision	  to	  create	  FMGs	  to	  two	  
main	  actors:	   the	  FMOQ,	  which	   represented	  Quebec’s	  general	  physicians,	  and	   the	  State.	  While	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associations,	   researchers,	   experts	   and	   the	   general	   public	   were	   all	   given	   the	   opportunity	   to	  
express	  an	  opinion,	   their	   influence	  on	  the	  decision	  remained	  marginal.	  Members	  of	   the	  public	  
demanded	   better	   access	   to	   services	   and	   better	  monitoring	   by	   general	   practitioners,	   but	   their	  
lack	   of	   agreement	   on	   specifics	   gave	   them	   little	   weight	   over	   the	   evolution	   of	   the	   model.	  
University	  researchers	  and	  experts	  were	  active	  in	  the	  development	  and	  promotion	  of	  the	  FMG	  
model,	  especially	  during	  the	  Clair	  Commission	  hearings,	  but	  were	  not	  at	  the	  table	  when	  the	  final	  
decision	  was	  made.	  	  The	  Government	  of	  Quebec	  and	  the	  FMOQ	  were	  thus	  left	  to	  craft	  a	  policy	  
that	  balanced	  a	  desire	  to	  innovate	  with	  the	  need	  for	  compromise.	  
The	  first	  feature	  we	  notice	  about	  the	  FMG	  policy-­‐making	  process	  is	  the	  diffusion	  of	  ideas.	  Ever	  
since	   the	   early	   1990s,	   both	   the	   federal	   government	   and	   the	   Government	   of	   Quebec	   had	  
recognized	   the	   need	   to	   reform	   front-­‐line	   services.	  Discussions	   and	   research	   abounded	  on	   the	  
best	   way	   to	   proceed	   and	   a	   range	   of	   actors	   proposed	   various	   ideas	   and	   solutions.	   These	  
proposals	   did	   not	   stem	   from	  a	   coherent,	   organized	   campaign	   in	   favour	   of	   a	   given	  model,	   but	  
were	  rather	  the	  product	  of	  an	  organic,	  generative	  process	   in	  which	   innovations	  were	  explored	  
and	   different	   possibilities	   emerged.	   The	   subsequent	   release	   of	   two	   reports	   (the	   Clair	  
Commission	  report	  and	  the	  SECOR	  report)	  caused	  new,	  more	  precise	  models	   to	  materialize	  as	  
vehicles	  for	  the	  crystallization	  and	  dissemination	  of	  these	  reflections.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  reports	  
were	   published	   at	   the	   same	   time	   underlines	   the	   fact	   that	   both	   doctors	   and	   the	   government	  
realized	   the	  urgency	  of	  addressing	   the	   three	  main	   issues:	  wide-­‐spread	  dissatisfaction	  with	   the	  
difficulty	   of	   accessing	   a	   family	   doctor,	   emergency	   room	   overcrowding	   due	   to	   the	   front	   line’s	  
incapacity	  to	  handle	  the	  patient	  load,	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  coordination	  and	  continuity	  of	  care.	  	  
That	   this	   realization	   led	   to	   innovation	   can	   be	   attributed	   to	   the	   way	   in	   which	   the	   Clair	  
Commission	   endowed	   the	   FMG	   model	   with	   characteristics	   that	   diverted	   from	   Quebec’s	  
traditional	  medical	  philosophy—the	   introduction	  of	  contracts,	  a	  multidisciplinary	  environment,	  
and	  so	  forth.	  Credit	  for	  the	  innovation’s	  adoption	  itself	  must	  go	  to	  the	  choice	  of	  president	  of	  the	  
Commission	  of	   Study	  of	  Health	  and	  Social	   Services	  and	  his	  working	  methods	  as	  well	   as	   to	   the	  
State’s	  compromise	  with	  general	  practitioners.	  More	  specifically,	  choosing	  as	  president	  Michel	  
Clair,	  who	  had	  been	  Minister	  of	  Energy	  and	  Natural	  Resources	  under	  the	  Parti	  Québécois	  (1985),	  
Director	   of	   the	   Quebec	   Association	   of	   Assisted	   Living	   Centres	   (1987-­‐1994)	   and	   President	   and	  
Chief	   Executive	   Officer	   of	   Hydro-­‐Québec	   International	   (1997-­‐2000),	   rendered	   the	   report’s	  
proposals	  particularly	  credible.	  The	  Clair	  Commission’s	  modus	  operandi	  also	  helped	  ideas	  evolve	  
about	   how	   to	   organize	   front-­‐line	   care.	   For	   one	   thing,	   the	   Commission	   took	   care	   to	   leverage	  
foreign	  experiences	   in	  order	   to	  ground	  the	  model	   in	   the	  best	  scientific	  evidence	  available.	  For	  
another,	   it	   listened,	   considered,	   studied,	   and	   negotiated;	   it	   synthesized	   the	   material	   and	  
solicited	  feedback;	  in	  short,	  it	  elevated	  the	  FMG	  model	  out	  of	  the	  specialized	  arena	  and	  secured	  
the	   public	   support	   necessary	   to	   move	   the	   project	   through	   the	   implementation	   phase.	   As	   a	  
result,	  the	  Commission	  did	  more	  than	  suggest	  an	  innovation:	  it	  worked	  to	  develop	  the	  political	  
conditions	   necessary	   for	   implementation—it	   worked	   to	   secure	   the	   buy-­‐in	   of	   the	   main	  
stakeholders.	  	  
The	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  model	  is	  innovative	  became	  all	  the	  more	  apparent	  when	  doctors	  finally	  
accepted	   patient	   registration	   and	   some	   extent	   of	   capitation.	   With	   this	   acceptance,	   the	   FMG	  
agreement	  surpassed	  the	  historical	  relationship	  between	  doctors	  and	  the	  State	  and	  opened	  the	  
door	  to	  the	  State	  asking	  doctors	  to	  adopt	  specific	  care	  practices	  and	  take	  responsibility	  for	  the	  
health	   of	   their	   patient	   population.	   In	   Quebec’s	   actual	   environment,	   where	   the	   National	  
Assembly	  is	  debating	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  institute	  for	  excellence	  in	  health	  and	  social	  services	  that	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would	   elaborate	   best	   practices	   guidelines	   for	   the	   care	   of	   patients	   with	   chronic	   disease	   (and	  
indicators	   with	   which	   to	   monitor	   FMG	   doctors’	   adherence),	   this	   opening	   could	   have	   a	  
determinative	   effect	   on	   the	   practices	   of	   general	   physicians	   (Institut	   national	   d'excellence	   en	  
santé	  et	  services	  sociaux	  2008).	  	  
Another	  innovation	  of	  the	  FMG	  model	  is	  the	  ubiquity	  of	  contracts:	  a	  contract	  associating	  doctors	  
who	  work	  together	  in	  an	  FMG,	  a	  contract	  between	  the	  FMG	  and	  the	  CSSS,	  a	  contract	  between	  
the	  FMG	  and	  the	  Health	  and	  Social	  Services	  Agency,	  and	  most	  uniquely,	  a	  contract	  between	  the	  
registered	  patient	  and	  his/her	  physician.	   	   It	   is	   this	   latter	   that	   is	   the	  most	  ground-­‐breaking	  and	  
that	  doctors	  have	  had	  the	  most	  difficulty	  in	  accepting,	  not	  only	  because	  they	  fear	  legal	  recourse	  
in	   the	   event	   that	   they	   should	   fail	   to	   respect	   their	   contractual	   commitment	   but	   also	   because	  
patients	  are	  not	  penalized	  for	  consulting	  a	  doctor	  other	  than	  the	  doctor	  with	  whom	  they	  have	  
signed	   a	   registration	   agreement,	   even	   though	   to	   do	   so	   causes	   the	   registered	   doctor	   to	   lose	  
income.	   With	   regard	   to	   the	   former	   concern,	   however,	   it	   seems	   that	   both	   Quebecers	   and	  
Canadians	  in	  general	  are	  slower	  to	  file	  for	  malpractice	  than	  are	  their	  neighbors	  to	  the	  south.	  
The	   State’s	   compromise,	   meanwhile,	   was	   the	   product	   of	   significant	   ideological	   differences	  
between	   the	   State	   and	   the	   FMOQ	   regarding	   remuneration	   methods	   and	   the	   organization	   of	  
front-­‐line	  care.	  The	  FMOQ	  felt	   that	  doctors	  should	  remain	   independent	  entrepreneurs	  paid	  by	  
fee-­‐for-­‐service	  and	  that	  the	  State	  should	  intervene	  little	  if	  at	  all	  in	  their	  operations.	  In	  the	  past,	  
doctors	  had	  found	  ways	  to	  network	  and	  increase	  both	  the	  range	  of	  services	  they	  offered	  and	  the	  
hours	   in	  which	   they	  offered	   them,	   for	  example	  by	   facilitating	  patients’	  access	   to	  specialists	  by	  
means	  of	  agreements	  between	  specialists	  and	  general	  practitioners.	  This	  system	  capitalized	  on	  
the	   initiatives	  of	   individual	  physicians	  and	   involved	  neither	  patient	   registration	  nor	   changes	   in	  
remuneration	   methods.	   The	   FMG	   model,	   in	   contrast,	   embodied	   responsibility	   for	   a	   given	  
population,	  codified	  by	  registration	  and	  recognized	  by	  a	  per	  capita	  payment	  that	  was	  termed	  a	  
“lump	   sum”	   (“forfait”	   in	   French)	   no	   doubt	   to	   sooth	   doctors’	   apprehensions.	   That	   the	  
confrontation	   of	   these	   two	   concepts	   gave	   way	   to	   negotiations	   and	   an	   eventual	   compromise	  
testifies	  firstly	  to	  the	  willingness	  of	  FMOQ	  negotiators	  to	  make	  concessions	  in	  order	  to	  improve	  
the	  organization	  of	  front-­‐line	  care	  and	  secondly	  to	  their	  realization	  that	  new	  modes	  of	  payment	  
for	   FMGs,	   namely	   capitation	   and	   management	   fees,	   boosted	   general	   practitioners’	   revenues	  
significantly,	   particularly	   for	   doctors	   who	   headed	   FMGs.	   Paid	   nurses	   and	   the	   purchase	   of	  
computers	   contributed	   further	   to	   the	   financing	   of	   front-­‐line	   care.	   Meanwhile,	   the	   use	   of	  
capitation	  as	  a	  mode	  of	  remuneration	  lost	  much	  of	  its	  symbolic	  value	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  
applied	  not	  just	  to	  registered	  patients	  but	  to	  all	  vulnerable	  patients,	  and	  it	  was	  extended	  to	  all	  
generalists,	  not	  just	  those	  working	  in	  FMGs.	  In	  short,	  the	  FMOQ	  may	  have	  accepted	  registration	  
and	  capitation	  but	  it	  succeeded	  in	  protecting	  doctors’	  freedom	  to	  work	  either	  together	  in	  FMGs	  
or	  solo	   in	  private	  clinics	  and	   in	  guaranteeing	  FMGs	  the	   latitude	  to	  partner	  with	  other	  clinics	   in	  
order	  to	  provide	  care	  outside	  of	  normal	  working	  hours.	  	  
This	   said,	   the	   final	   configuration	   of	   FMGs	   enabled	   the	   State	   to	   exit	   a	   status	   quo	   that	   had	  
dominated	  the	  healthcare	  landscape	  since	  the	  creation	  of	  Medicare.	  For	  the	  first	  time	  ever,	  the	  
State	   convinced	   physicians	   to	   accept	   a	   new	   ideology	   marked	   by	   contracts	   between	   doctors,	  
patients	   and	   the	   State.	   It	   did	   this	   by	   boosting	   physicians’	   remuneration	   and	   by	   valuing	   their	  
operating	   methods	   without	   directly	   challenging	   their	   professional	   freedom:	   this	   strategy	  
permitted	  doctors	  to	  save	  face.	  The	  victory	  was	  all	  the	  more	  impressive	  given	  that	  it	  took	  pace	  in	  
a	  pre-­‐electoral	  period	  during	  which	  health	  care	  was	  the	  principal	  campaign	  issue.	  
Canadian	  Political	  Science	  Review	  3(4)	  December	  2009	  
	  
	   Quebec’s	  Family	  Medicine	  Groups	  (31-­‐46)	   43	  
It	  will	   be	   interesting	   to	   observe	  whether	   this	   first	   shift	   in	   doctor-­‐State	   relations	  will	   lead	   to	   a	  
more	  authoritarian	  rapport	  whereby	  doctors	  will	  be	  required	  to	  account	  to	  the	  government	  for	  
their	   care	   of	   patients.	   It	   will	   also	   be	   interesting	   to	   see	  whether	   this	   evolution	   in	  Quebec	  will	  
impact	  other	  Canadian	  provinces	  (Hutchison	  2008;	  Hutchison	  et	  al.	  2001;	  Lamarche	  et	  al.	  2003;	  
Van	   Soeren	   et	   al.	   2008;	  Wilson	   et	   al.	   2004).	   Finally,	   the	   first	  wave	   of	   FMGs	   has	   already	   been	  
evaluated	  (Ministère	  de	  la	  Santé	  et	  des	  Services	  sociaux	  2008),	  but	  with	  time,	  more	  evaluations	  
and	  historical	  perspective	  will	  allow	  the	  observer	  to	  assess	  whether	   initial	  objectives	  for	  FMGs	  
are	   met	   and,	   what	   is	   perhaps	   most	   interesting	   of	   all,	   whether	   Quebec’s	   new	   model	   for	  
organizing	  front-­‐line	  services	  will	  indeed	  deliver	  better	  and	  more	  cost-­‐effective	  patient	  care.	  
Endnotes
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Another	  18%	  of	  general	  practitioners	  worked	  principally	   in	  FMGs,	  19%	  worked	  principally	   in	  CLSCs	  and	  
1%	  worked	  in	  other	  settings	  (i.e,	  detention	  centres	  or	  network	  clinics,	  etc.)	  (Fédération	  des	  médecins	  
omnipraticiens	  du	  Québec	  2008).	  	  	  
2	  The	  Commission	  of	  Study	  of	  Health	  and	  Social	  Services	  was	  in	  session	  from	  June	  to	  December	  2000.	  
3	  After	  the	  implementation	  of	  Bill	  25	  in	  2004,	  CLSCs	  merged	  with	  residential	  and	  long-­‐term	  care	  facilities	  
(Centres	   d’hébergement	   et	   de	   soins	   de	   longue	   durée	   -­‐	   CHSLDs)	   and	   in	   some	   cases	   with	   hospital	  
centres	  in	  order	  to	  form	  a	  new	  local	  entity:	  Health	  and	  Social	  Services	  Centres	  (CSSSs)	  (Québec	  2003).	  	  
4	  Working	  under	  the	  new	  Local	  Health	  and	  Social	  Services	  Networks	  Development	  Agencies,	  the	  DRMGs	  
have	   the	   mandate	   to	   propose	   and	   implement	   medical	   staffing	   plans	   and	   plans	   for	   the	   regional	  
organization	  of	  medical	  services,	  including	  an	  integrated	  network	  for	  on-­‐call	  medical	  services	  (Québec	  
2008).	  	  
5	  Remuneration	  has	   since	   increased.	  As	  of	  2009,	  doctors	   receive	  $8	  per	   registered	  patient,	   around-­‐the-­‐
clock	  access	  is	  paid	  $56	  per	  day	  of	  work	  (up	  from	  $52	  in	  2003),	  and	  the	  doctor	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  FMG	  
receives	  approximately	  $338	  per	  week	  (Régie	  de	  l'assurance	  maladie	  du	  Québec	  2009).	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